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Killing Two Achievements with One 
Stone: The Intersectional Impact of  
Shelby County on the Rights to Vote and 
Access High Performing Schools 
 
STEVEN L. NELSON, J.D., PH.D.* 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although the pursuits of educational equity and access to the 
electoral franchise were both key components of the Civil Rights 
Movement, scholars often speak about educational equity and the 
right to vote as separate, coexisting efforts towards achieving civil 
rights.  It is rare for scholars to discuss the intersection of educational 
equity and access to the electoral franchise as a combined approach to 
pursuing civil rights.  The two are linked, however, given our 
country’s propensity for electing school boards.1  School boards are 
generally responsible for the operation and supervision of a 
jurisdiction’s schools, and nearly all school boards in the United States 
are elected.2  School boards, because of their unique position as the 
closest form of our representative republic to a direct democracy, 
 
* Dr. Nelson is an Assistant Professor of Leadership and Policy Studies at the 
University of Memphis.  Dr. Nelson earned his Ph.D. from the Pennsylvania State 
University Department of Education Policy Studies and his Juris Doctor from the 
University of Iowa College of Law.  His research considers the intersectional impacts 
of movements towards or from civil rights in education. 
1.  See generally FREDERICK HESS, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CEN-
TURY: CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES OF DISTRICT GOVERNANCE (2002), http://files.
eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED469432.pdf [hereinafter NSBA REPORT]. 
2.  Id. at 5.  
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often open doors to future political pursuits for Black candidates, 
particularly in larger, more urban districts where Black candidates 
appear to be slightly overrepresented on elected school boards.3  
School board membership may give Black politicians a brand name, 
political experience, and perhaps, promote future political 
participation4—essentially, school board membership affords Black 
candidates a springboard into their political careers.   
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder,5 
though not ostensibly an educational equity and access case, has and 
will have tremendous effects on Black school board candidates’ 
abilities to earn seats in some areas, and will impact their access to the 
peripheral benefits of serving on an elected school board.  Moreover, 
the Court’s decision in Shelby County has and will impact the ability 
of Black electors in majority-minority districts to impact education 
policy and the politics of education.  This Article uses the rise of self-
selected school boards managing charter schools in New Orleans, 
Louisiana—the epicenter of the charter school movement—to 
problematize the Court’s Shelby County decision.  In particular, this 
Article addresses the sometimes unstated connection between the 
right to vote and the right to equitable educational access.  
Specifically, this Article analyzes the data surrounding charter school 
board diversity efforts in New Orleans with a necessary discussion of 
the relationship between the accountability of popularly elected 
school boards and charter school academics.  Finally, this Article 
makes recommendations for the implementation or reauthorization 
of charter school legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  HESS, supra note 1, at 4. 
4.  Abe Feuerstein, Elections, Voting and Democracy in Local School District  Go-
vernance, 16 EDUC. POL’Y, 15–36 (2002). 
5.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
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I.   A Brief History of the Civil Rights Movement’s    
   Cornerstones: The Electoral Franchise and    
    Educational Access 
 
Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“the Act”), the federal 
government attempted to remedy Black Americans’ 
disenfranchisement.6  However, these efforts produced little to no 
results in guaranteeing access to political participation through the 
electoral franchise.7  Congress long resisted the implementation of 
more robust voting rights protections for Black Americans at the 
wishes of White southern politicians.8  States also effectively 
continued to find alternate paths to exclude Blacks from the political 
process despite the fact that the 15th Amendment purported to assure 
protection from Black voter disenfranchisement.9  Key anti-civil rights 
events10 occurred in 1965 prompting the implementation of sweeping 
protections guaranteeing the electoral franchise for Blacks.   
The Act included key provisions that aided in the prevention of 
Black voter disenfranchisement.  The two greatest protections under 
 
6.  The 15th Amendment, passed during Reconstruction, was previously the most 
notable attempt at remedying voter disenfranchisement.  Though partially successful, 
the 15th Amendment’s effectiveness faded as the Reconstruction period ended.  Due 
in part to extreme violence and intimidation, Black Americans—mostly former slaves 
and their descendants—remained largely unable to access the electoral franchise, see 
generally, Steven L. Nelson, Balancing School Choice and Political Voice: An Analysis 
of the Legality of Public Charter Schools in New Orleans, Louisiana Under Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act (Dec. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania 
State University) (on file with author). 
7.  In particular, the southern region of the United States saw little-to-no results 
from previous voting rights activism; other parts of the nation saw little-to-no results, 
as well.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORY OF FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS LAWS: THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, http://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-
laws (last updated Aug. 8, 2015) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT]. 
8.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 12 (1982) (establishing that even after the Act many 
Southern states resisted compliance). 
9.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5 (1982). 
10.  Bloody Sunday may have had the most impact in spurring Congress to act as 
images of Black citizens seeking the franchise—and being beaten for doing so—were 
spread, both nationally and internationally. 
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the Act were section 2 and section 5.11  Section 2 of the Act had national 
applicability and generally banned the denial and/or abridgement of 
the right to participate in the political process.12  In other words, 
section 2’s prohibitions were not limited in the scope of state actions 
covered and could be applied generally to any effort to violate a 
citizen’s right to vote.13  Section 2 addressed the fact that little to no 
progress had been made at the national level in remedying voter 
disenfranchisement.14  Unfortunately, section 2’s protections were 
remedial in nature and required aggrieved parties to first allege some 
realized harm to file suit.15  On the other hand, section 5 targeted 
jurisdictions with a history steeped in denying Blacks the right to the 
electoral franchise.16  As such, it granted the Department of Justice 
increased oversight in the political and electoral processes in these 
jurisdictions since they were deemed more likely to create obstacles 
to obtaining or maintaining Blacks’ right to vote.17   
Section 5 was the most powerful provision of the Act.  It granted 
the Department of Justice the power to directly attack the systematic 
disfranchisement of Black voters in covered jurisdictions.  Section 5 
required federal approval of all changes to voting schemes of all 
depths and breadths; its protections were preemptive.18  Jurisdictions 
covered under section 5 were required to submit any changes to the 
jurisdiction’s voting laws and procedures for preclearance by federal 
officials.19  If a jurisdiction violated section 5’s preclearance 
requirements, the new voting procedures would be deemed invalid 
 
11.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
12.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, http://www.jus
tice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
13.  Id. 
14.  HISTORY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 7. 
15.  See generally Nelson, supra note 6. 
16.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE SHELBY 
COUNTY DECISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2015) [hereinafter ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE ACT]. 
17.  Id.  
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
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and could be enjoined upon petition from private plaintiffs or the 
federal government.20   
Section 4 of the Act provided a formula establishing the specific 
jurisdictions that were covered under section 5 and those 
jurisdictions’ eventual bailout from section 5 coverage.21  Effectively, 
a jurisdiction that was required to seek preclearance under section 5 
could, after a decade without certain violations of the Act, be excused 
from the requirement to seek preclearance.  The Supreme Court then 
disarmed section 5 of its powers in the Shelby County decision, the 
significance of which will be further discussed in Section I.A.22  Thus, 
the remedial measures of section 2 are the only significant protections 
currently available under the Act for Black voters seeking to gain and 
assure racial representation on legislative bodies.23  Section 2’s 
remedial measures, however, may not provide adequate voting 
protections for Blacks to maintain, retain, or obtain political voice and 
participation under extant judicial precedent because section 2 does 
not expressly prohibit the vacillation between types of selection 
schemes that could impact minority representation.24  In effect, 
jurisdictions may now be able to avoid racial diversity on legislative 
bodies by simply altering the selection or election scheme affecting 
groups formerly covered under section 5.  
In the first seventeen years after the Act’s passage, the law 
underwent several reauthorizations and amendments.  Reauthoriza-
tions and amendments necessitated new interpretations of the Act.  
During the 1970s, the federal courts held that any voting scheme that 
diluted the voting power of Blacks violated the Act.25  However, in 
1980 that rule would change; the Supreme Court would conclude that 
only voting schemes that intentionally abridged or denied the voting 
rights of minorities would violate the Act.26  This new standard, set 
 
20.  Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
21.  Id. 
22.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612.  
23.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
24.  S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 6 (1982). 
25.  See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
26.  City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62–64 (1980) (plurality decision). 
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forth in City of Mobile v. Bolden, required proof of intent as opposed to 
result or impact, making it much harder for plaintiffs to prove their 
claims.27 
In 1982, Congress moved to amend the Act after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bolden.28  Plaintiffs could once again prove their 
cases without proving that voting schemes were intentionally 
dilutive; the amendment reestablished the burden of proof that 
plaintiffs previously had to meet to establish a section 2 claim.29  The 
Supreme Court took its first opportunity to consider the 1982 
amendments in Thornburg v. Gingles.30  The Thornburg Court found 
that the amended section 2 made clear that the appropriate test for a 
section 2 case was the “results test” as opposed to the “intent test.”31  
The Court also concluded that the intent test had to be rejected 
because Congress believed the intent test was problematic for various 
reasons.32  The Court held that that the intent test advocated for in 
Bolden pitted communities against each other.  Under the intent test, 
charges of racism were frequently hurled against community 
members.33  Furthermore, the Court found only that intent was 
excessively difficult for plaintiffs to prove and did not reach the root 
issue of section 2.34  Thus, the Court held that an intent test might only 
regulate the most extreme cases of denial or abridgement.35  Post-
Thornburg, Bolden’s intent test has been both rebuked and 
repudiated.36  The language of section 2 of the Act, as of the 1982 
 
27.  Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62–64. 
28.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). 
29.  Id. at 43–44. 
30.  Id. at 35. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 43–44. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 44.  However, some courts have viewed the 1982 Amendments as an 
amendment to Bolden.  E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Chattanooga, 722 F. Supp. 
380, 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that if a system was conceived for a discriminatory 
purpose and it continues to serve that purpose, the system is unconstitutional).  In 
practical terms, this distinction is not material. 
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amendments, was originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973.  That 
language now states, in part: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race 
or color…. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is 
established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of 
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice….37 
In addition to the section 2 protections, section 5 of the Act 
advanced voting rights protections for minority communities across 
the country, especially in the Deep South.38  When the Supreme Court 
invalidated section 4 of the Act—practically ending section 5 
enforcement—these communities were left with the remedial 
measures of section 2 in lieu of the preemptive measures of section 5.39  
States are now presumably free to gerrymander electoral districts to 
assure political victories for candidates that are not particularly in 
favor of the political ideals shared by many in the Black community.  
States may also be free to completely rid Black populations of 
opportunities to meaningfully participate in the political process 
 
37.  52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2015) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). 
38.  The following states were covered under section 5 prior to the Court’s decision 
in Shelby County and were just recently bailed out of section 5 coverage in their entireties 
per the Shelby County decision: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.  The following states were partially 
covered under section 5 prior to the Court’s decision in Shelby County and were just 
recently bailed out of section 5 coverage in their entireties per the Shelby County 
decision: California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and 
South Dakota.  See ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE ACT, supra note 16. 
39.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
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through the nixing of popularly elected officials in favor of appointed 
boards so long as states’ explicit racial animus is not evident in their 
actions.   
Although then-Attorney General Eric Holder and the United 
States Department of Justice filed multiple actions under section 2 
after the Court’s decision in Shelby County,40 political commentary 
from various sources indicate that ending section 5 enforcement has 
aided in the retrenchment of voting rights protections in the Deep 
South.41  In her dissenting opinion, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg mentioned several instances of premature attacks on the 
voting rights of minorities.42  Some states moved to restrict the voting 
rights of minorities even before or immediately after the dismantling 
of the Act’s most powerful restrictions.  To add to Justice Ginsburg’s 
list, some other states attempted to pass restrictive identification 
requirements, which have been linked to the obstruction of political 
participation for minority voters.43  
Louisiana completely disrupted and displaced the section 5-
protected, predominately Black and popularly elected Orleans Parish 
School Board after Hurricane Katrina decimated its southeast coast.44  
The state of Louisiana took advantage of the evacuation of New 
 
40.  See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, No. 13-cv-861 (M.D.N.C. 
Sept. 30, 2013). 
41.  Jason Zengerle, The New Racism: This is How the Civil Rights Movement Ends, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119019/civil-
rights-movement-going-reverse-alabama; Myrna Perez & Vishal Agraharkar, If 
Section 5 Falls: New Voting Implications, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2013), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Section_5_New_Voting_Implicati
ons.pdf. 
42.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2646–47. 
43.  See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015) (striking down restric-
tive provisions of a proposed Texas Voter Identification Law); but cf. Alice Ollstein, 
After Alabama Enforces Voter ID, Shuts Down DMVs in Black Communities, Lawmaker 
Wants Investigation, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 6, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://thinkprogress.
org/politics/2015/10/06/3709020/alabama-dmv-voters/ (questioning the motives be-
hind the implementation of voter identification requirements need in Alabama that 
occur just prior to the closure of facilities that produce the required forms of 
identification). 
44.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
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Orleans’s predominately Black population to install an appointed, 
predominately White and state-run school board that gave way to 
self-selected, predominately White charter school boards.45  The 
usurping of Black political and electoral power as pertaining to 
education policy in New Orleans occurred under the restrictive watch 
of section 5.  Other reductions in Black voting protections and rights 
still occur even though Blacks in the Deep South continue to play a 
critical role in national politics.46   
While Black Americans played a crucial role in electing the first 
Black President, President Barack Obama, to the White House, there 
are less obvious indicators of Black political involvement and 
influence.47  In congressional elections, Black voters typically exercise 
political influence by electing moderate or liberal White politicians to 
office.48  In Louisiana, Mary Landrieu, the former-Democratic Senator, 
relied on a large Black voter turnout to maintain her position in the 
United States Senate.49  Some observers have, however, noted that 
Black voters are not encountering similar and sustained electoral 
success at the state and local level as they are at the federal level.50  
This is true in Louisiana where there has never been a Black 
governor,51 even with a third of the state’s population being Black.  
Moreover, the state of Louisiana has had a decorated past of denying 
the electoral franchise to minorities, even within the last decade.52  
The crippling of section 5’s robust and powerful protections adds 
to the list of cases that have retracted civil rights for minority groups.  
Arguably, it is no coincidence that these cases began with seeking 
 
45.  Steven L. Nelson, Gaining Choice and Losing Voice: Is the New Orleans Charter 
School Takeover a Case of the Emperor’s New Clothes?, in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS: SCHOOL 
CHOICE AND EQUITY POST-HURRICANE KATRINA 237, 246–47 (Luis Miron, Brian R. 
Beabout, & Joseph Boselovic eds., 2015) [hereinafter Gaining Choice and Losing Voice]. 
46.  Zengerle, supra note 41. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id.  
49.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
50.  Zengerle, supra note 41. 
51.  Debo P. Adegbile, Voting Rights in Louisiana: 1982-2006, at 10 (2006), http://
www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/voting/LouisianaVRA.pdf.  
52.  Id. 
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educational equity in public primary and secondary schools.  Closely 
scrutinizing the history of education law allows one to ascertain the 
true depth of possible retrenchment that resulted from the Court’s 
holding in Shelby County.  The Supreme Court began to show signs of 
exhaustion with the Civil Rights Movement as early as the mid-1970s.  
School desegregation had experienced a short peak in the two prior 
decades.  Due largely in part to the Court’s efforts at consensus 
building, previous Courts unanimously held in favor of Black 
plaintiffs seeking once limited, if not totally foreclosed, educational 
opportunities to Black students.   
This era started in the 1950s when the Supreme Court held that 
the state of Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it created a law school for its Black 
students as a method of avoiding the integration of its all-White law 
school.53  The Court then unanimously decided that under the same 
constitutional provision the state of Oklahoma could not mandate that 
a Black student, admitted to graduate school, be required to sit in the 
hallway near a classroom to prevent the integration of Black and 
White students.54  This run of unanimity continued with Brown v. 
Board of Education (Brown I).55  Brown I overturned the separate but 
equal policy advanced in Plessy v. Ferguson56 and explicitly required 
school districts nationwide to desegregate their schools.57  Brown I and 
Brown II,58 the latter of which required schools to desegregate with “all 
deliberate speed,” have become stalwarts of desegregation efforts 
though some scholars have argued against such a solitary and 
restrictive method of achieving educational equity.59 
 
53.  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
54.  McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
55.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
56.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
57.  Although the school desegregation cases had national affect and effect, the 
primary area of focus in desegregating schools was in the American South.  Northern 
segregation was, to some extent, not viewed as a problem (see Gary Orfield, Prologue: 
Lessons Forgotten, in Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield, LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: 
REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 1–6 (2007). 
58.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
59.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
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Throughout the 1960s, the Court extended its run of unanimous 
rulings in favor of school desegregation and educational equity for 
minority students.  In 1968, a unanimous Court ruled that minimalist 
desegregation strategies, or strategies that effectively maintained the 
status quo, were unsatisfactory under the order issued in Brown II.60  
In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,61 the Court 
established an integration checklist to determine if meaningful 
desegregation had occurred in a given school district.  The Green 
factors consider the racial proportions of students, faculty, and staff 
assigned to specific schools, as well as absolute equality of 
transportation, facilities, and extracurricular activities.62  Until the 
early 1990s, school districts were required to fulfill all of these 
requirements in relative temporal proximity to each other to escape 
federal district court supervision.63   
In the early-to-mid 1990s, the Court issued a series of rulings that 
placed barriers in the path of meaningful efforts at desegregating the 
nation’s public schools.64  After Freeman v. Pitts,65 school districts could 
fulfill these requirements individually or all at once, notwithstanding 
the time of each individual fulfillment.66  When combining the 
implications of Freeman with the Court’s decision on school 
 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 470–516 (1976). 
60.  Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  In 1992, in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), school districts were generally 
thought to be required to fulfill all Green factors simultaneously to achieve unitary 
status.  Post-Freeman, it was clear that the Court would allow school districts to fulfill 
the Green factors in a piecemeal fashion, and once all Green factors were fulfilled—
notwithstanding the contemporaneous nature or lack thereof of the fulfillment(s)—
school districts would be released from federal supervision. 
64.  See, e.g, Freeman, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); see also, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 
(1995). 
65.  Freeman, 503 U.S. 467. 
66.  The piecemeal fulfillment of Green factors often resulted in regression to se-
gregative practices, and that regression was a notable consequence to the evaluation 
of the fulfillment of other Green factors (see Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in  
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1–
22 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996). 
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desegregation immediately preceding Freeman, school districts could 
address one Green factor at a time.67  Once unitary status of each 
individual factor was achieved, school districts were completely free 
of federal mandates to address existing or prevent future school 
segregation.68  Gary Orfield of the Civil Rights Project, a nationally 
recognized expert on school desegregation, has asserted that school 
districts were not only free of mandates to desegregate schools, but 
under federal cases, such as Board of Education v. Dowell, Freeman and 
Missouri v. Jenkins, school districts released from federal supervision 
were also free to commence plans that would revert to practices that 
led to the initially violative segregation of public schools.69 
In the early 1970s, proponents of desegregated schools continued 
to win in federal court although to a lesser extent.  The Court 
continued with unanimous decisions; as time progressed, however, 
judicial decisions became split, with consensus-building becoming 
less important than it was in the 1950s and 1960s.  In Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,70 a unanimous Supreme 
Court upheld the busing of students to and from school as a remedy 
for de jure segregation.  The Court, in Swann, reached a unanimous 
decision, but the Court’s consensus began to dissolve by 1972.  Wright 
v. Council of City of Emporia71 and United States v. Scotland Neck City 
Board of Education72 are both cases where proponents of school 
desegregation avoided attempts to resegregate (or maintain 
segregation) in public schools, but neither case enjoyed the consensus 
opinion won before previous Courts.  In both Wright and Scotland 
Neck, all of the justices agreed in the result of the case, despite the fact 
that four justices in each case submitted varying rationales for 
reaching the holding in each case.   
 
67.  Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490–91. 
68.  Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48 (1991). 
69.  Orfield, supra note 57, at 2. 
70.  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1970). 
71.  Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
72.  United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
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The cracks in the former consensus became insurmountable in 
the first Milliken v. Bradley decision.73  In Milliken I, the Court limited 
school desegregation plans to only those districts previously guilty of 
de jure segregation.74  A majority of the Court drew a line in the 
proverbial sand of desegregation and used artificial and arbitrary 
geographic boundaries to do so.  Post-Milliken I, integration-minded 
school officials were left with the option to pursue equal educational 
opportunity as opposed to desegregation in effectuating educational 
equity.75  In effect, Milliken I chilled efforts at school desegregation.  
Even state statutes pursuing integration became ineffective at 
remedying segregation.76  Moreover, the guidance from the second 
Milliken decision and other legal remedies aimed at increasing 
financial capital for struggling minority school districts continued to 
be of no or very little avail in efforts to funnel more money into 
disproportionately poor and minority schools.77 
As the Supreme Court reneged on its promise to desegregate the 
nation’s public schools, there was a simultaneous return to segregated 
schools.  Research by the Civil Rights Project stated that the only 
concentrated period of school integration was the decade 
immediately following the enactment of the civil rights legislation of 
the 1960s.78  This same research reported statistics that supported the 
conclusion that schools became increasingly segregated over the 
 
73.  Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
74.  Id. at 752–53. 
75.  See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
76.  Steven L. Nelson & Alison C. Tyler, Examining Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission v. School District of Philadelphia: Considering How the Supreme 
Court’s Waning Support of School Desegregation Affected State-Based Desegregation Efforts, 
40 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
77.  Cf. Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City: Major Investments with 
Modest Returns, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 66, at 241. 
78.  GARY ORFIELD ET AL., CIV. RTS. PROJECT, E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING 
DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 7–10 (2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.
edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separati
on-deepening-doublesegregation-for-morestudents/orfield_epluribus_revised_complete
_2012.pdf. 
4 NELSON_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2016  8:04 PM 
238 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII 
decades immediately following the 1960s.79  Thus, efforts at school 
desegregation became regressive, and not simply static, following the 
end of affirmative civil rights legislation.  In particular, there has only 
been significant progress in integrating the most segregated schools 
in the country—those schools that are almost exclusively filled with 
students of one race; the integration of all other schools has faltered 
severely since the 1960s.80  This is unsettling considering the plethora 
of literature that supports the notion that students in integrated 
schools have better academic, social, and occupational trajectories 
than students in segregated schools.81  The increasing number of 
charter schools only contributes to the already-increasing segregation 
in public schools,82 which are now more segregated than they were 
during de jure segregation.83  
Nonetheless, these schools may still provide adequate 
educational experiences for their chiefly minority student bodies even 
though judicial rulings continue to promote segregative policies.  
Some literature suggests that assuring adequate minority 
representation on school boards—at least in the traditional public 
school setting—is one method of providing for educational equity.84  
Further research is necessary to determine if this correlation also 
 
79.  ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 78, at 76. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See generally Erica Frankenberg, Introduction: School Integration—The Time 
Is Now, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN 
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 7–27 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007). 
82.  ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RTS. PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: 
CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 37–38 (Jan. 
2010), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversi
ty/choice-without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf. 
83.  ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 78, at 76. 
84.  See MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLITICS 
AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2010); Ted Robinson et al., Black 
Resources and Black School Board Representation: Does Political Structure Matter? 66 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 976 (1985); Kenneth J. Meier & Robert E. England, Black Representation and 
Educational Policy: Are They Related?, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 392, 397 (1984); but see 
Joseph Stewart, Jr. et al., Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School 
Board to Office to Classroom, 42 W. POL. Q. 287 (1989) (questioning the relationship 
between descriptive representation and substantive representation). 
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holds true for public charter schools.85  Just as integrated schools are 
linked to better academic results for minority students, the presence 
of minority school board members is linked to better academic 
indicators (outside of test scores).  Another study, in the context of 
New Orleans, found that a lack of political accountability has 
produced greater entry points into the school-to-prison pipeline for 
students.86 
 
A.  The Impact of Invalidating Section 4 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 
 
The Supreme Court issued its most important and 
groundbreaking decision on the Act in 2013.  In Shelby County, the 
Court held that Congress’ reauthorization of the coverage formula for 
section 4 of the Act was unconstitutional.87  Shelby County, a section 
5-covered jurisdiction in Alabama, challenged section 4(b) and section 
5 of the Act as facially unconstitutional.88  Despite the fact that two 
federal courts had found Congress’ evaluation of substantial evidence 
in support of the Act’s most extreme—and effective—provisions, the 
 
85.  Compare Steven L. Nelson & Jennifer E. Grace, The Right to Remain Silent in 
New Orleans: The Role of Self-Selected Charter School Boards on the School-to-Prison 
Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2016) (finding links between better 
student outcomes and more traditional educational approaches) with Christine H. 
Roch & David W. Pitts, Differing Effects of Representative Bureaucracy in Charter Schools 
and Traditional Public Schools, 42 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 282 (2012) (finding better links 
between better student outcomes and less traditional educational approaches, not 
looking at teacher representation which is weakly correlated to board representation). 
86.  Nelson & Grace, supra note 85 (finding that school boards in New Orleans 
that were not politically accountable were more likely to report dropout rates and 
disciplinary rates that exceeded Louisiana state averages and also finding that school 
boards that lacked political accountability were more likely to report college 
matriculation rates that lagged behind the Louisiana state average); see also, Kenneth 
J. Meier & Joseph Stewart, Jr., The Impact of Representative Bureaucracies: Educational 
Systems and Public Policies, 22 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 157 (1992) (discussing the various 
methods of measuring substantive representation). 
87.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612.  
88.  Id. at 2621–22. 
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Court concluded otherwise.89  The Court reasoned that enforcement 
of section 5 had become more stringent over time despite dramatic 
improvements among some measures of voting equality,90 and that 
other states—some with similar breaches of voting protections for 
minorities—were also not covered under section 5.91  This ultimately 
led the Court to agree with the findings of a dissenting federal appeals 
court judge: that coverage under section 5 was an indicator of greater, 
not lesser, political participation among minorities.92  
The majority opinion in Shelby County discussed whether 
improvements in political participation, measured by voter 
registration and voter turnout gaps, were the product of section 5 
coverage.  This discussion, however, was limited to the past successes 
of section 5, not the continued need for section 5’s protections.93  The 
Court decided that the coverage formula of section 4, which had not 
been altered in recent amendments to the Act, was unconstitutional.94  
The Court issued its ruling in spite of the fact that the Court itself had 
recognized that voting discrimination still existed.95  
While some have argued that Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shelby 
County was scathing, the Justice’s response to the majority opinion 
appears to reveal as much confusion as anger.  Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent questions whether the Act’s most effective tool to remedy 
voting discrimination was a victim of its own success.96  Moreover, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argues there is more work to be done in the 
area of voting rights in the Deep South.97  Justice Ginsburg also 
 
89.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621–23. 
90.  Id. at 2625–27. 
91.  Id. at 2629 (citing Northwest Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), to assert that 
section 5 must determine the coverage states in an equitable and sensible manner). 
92.  Id. at 2622. 
93.  Id. at 2624–28. 
94.  Id. at 2627–28. 
95.  Id. at 2633 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting). 
96.  Id. at 2633–34 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting). 
97.  Id. at 2612, 2645 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting) (The Deep South, including Texas, but 
excluding Florida and Arkansas, continues to lead the nation in the race for the dubious 
honor of having the most confirmed incidents of voting discrimination.  In particular, 
Alabama was second only to Mississippi in successful section 2 challenges). 
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discusses the changing nature of voting rights challenges, specifically: 
first-generation issues—access to the franchise—versus second-
generation issues—accessing adequate and effective representation.98 
Justice Ginsburg’s confusion might originate from the fact that the 
majority opinion, to a great extent, agrees that there is work to do in 
promoting voting rights.  The majority, in one watershed decision, 
chose to eliminate section 4 and restrict section 5, two of the Act’s most 
powerful provisions.  
To be clear, the Court’s holding in Shelby County kept section 5 
intact, but it is now practically unenforceable without a functioning 
section 4 because section 4 dictates which jurisdictions are to be 
covered under section 5.  The Court also left open the door to reinstate 
the bail-in provisions of section 4.  Once the Court issued its holding 
in Shelby County, scholars immediately began to analyze the holding’s 
prospective impact on elections of national import.  The holding’s 
impact on local elections did not garner as much attention 
immediately upon the release of the Court’s decision.   
Furthermore, another cornerstone of the Civil Rights 
Movement—equal educational access—was simultaneously 
undergoing substantial change in the form of the charter school 
movement.  As the number of charter schools increased, the number 
of self-selected governing boards of those schools also increased.  
Presumably, an enforceable section 5 could be used to restrict these 
changes if the changes negatively affected minority voters in 
jurisdictions covered under section 5.  However, the Court’s holding 
in Shelby County, in combination with the increased momentum of the 
charter school movement provided the perfect storm of confusion for 
the results of the Civil Rights Movement.   
Two of the Act’s guarantees—protecting minority voting rights 
and integration, the preferred method of gaining access to equitable 
education—were at risk of retraction, if not outright defeat.  While 
access to a charter school education has been framed as a civil right to 
a quality education,99 the lack of electoral accountability for charter 
 
98.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635. 
99.  Janell Scott, School Choice as a Civil Right: The Political Construction of a Claim 
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schools,100 the fact that charter schools may contribute to the school-
to-prison pipeline,101 and the fact that charter schools are more 
segregated than public schools102 juxtaposes the concept of charter 
schools to traditional concepts of civil rights.103   
In most areas of the country, charter schools encompass only a 
small share of the public school enrollment, so there appears to be 
very little need to address how the charter school movement affects 
voting rights and broadly defined political participation for Blacks on 
a national level.  New Orleans, however, stands in contrast to the rest 
of the nation.  Its predominately Black voting age population and 
almost entirely charter school educational structure provide the ideal 
case study for evaluating Black communities’ ability to hold its 
policymakers and implementers politically accountable under a near 
exclusive, self-selected charter school governance regime.  Assessing 
the impact of charter schools on Blacks’ political power in New 
Orleans is also important because New Orleans’s school reform 
movement has been touted as a miracle in urban renewal and a 
national model for urban school reform.104 
A review of pertinent legal cases reveals that issues of 
educational equity and equal educational access have not been a top 
priority for the Supreme Court in recent years.  The Court’s decision 
in Shelby County, while not a decision about educational equity, may 
have practical effects on the ability of Blacks to obtain, maintain and 
retain political involvement at the local—especially school board—
level.  The remainder of this Article will examine whether state 
 
and its Implications for School Desegregation, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING 
SOCIETY: NEW POLICIES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR A MULTIRACIAL GENERATION 32, 32–52 
(2011). 
100.  Gaining Choice and Losing Voice, supra note 45. 
101.  Nelson & Grace, supra note 83.  
102.  See generally Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, Choice 
Without Equity: Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2011), 
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/779. 
103.  Steven L. Nelson & Heather N. Bennett, At the Intersection of the Voting Rights 
Act, the Equal Protection Clause and the School Choice Movement: Have the Courts Built a 
House of Cards? 10 DUKE J. CON. LAW & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming May 2016). 
104.  Nelson, supra note 6, at 24. 
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constitutional provisions requiring elected school boards might 
provide additional protections for Black and/or Brown voters seeking 
to influence school board composition through the political process.   
If this is not the case, the Court’s holding in Shelby County could 
pose an additional obstacle to educational equity in New Orleans’s 
public and almost uniformly chartered schools.  In particular, New 
Orleans and most of Louisiana’s public charter schools utilize self-
selected governing boards with little local political accountability 
through the voting process.  Thus, predominately Black school 
districts that are taken over by the state consequently lose the ability 
to impact education policy and the politics of education.  These 
districts also experience a reduced ability to influence race relations 
in schools because minority school board members who might act to 
ameliorate race-related issues are no longer present.  This is true 
because Louisiana is free to create alternative boards with more 
political power than the school board elected by the predominately 
Black electorate in New Orleans. 
 
II.  Charter Schools and the “New Civil Right:” Proven  
      Issues, Debatable Achievement, and a Mirage of  
      Accountability? 
 
It is important that scholars research the impacts of the charter 
school movement for various reasons.  The rapid growth of charter 
schools cannot be contested.  Charter schools have experienced 
substantial and exponential growth since their creation in 1991.105  In 
just over two decades of existence, charter schools have faced an 
assemblage of legal challenges.  These schools have, for the most part, 
survived those challenges and continued to thrive.  At least one state, 
however, has found the funding formula for charter schools to violate 
 
105.  FAILED PROMISES: ASSESSING CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES, INST. ON 
RACE & POVERTY 3 (2008), http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploa ds/5f/ca/5fcac972c2598a7a5
0423850eed0f6b4/8-Failed-Promises-Assessing-Charter-Schools-in-the-Twin-Cities.pdf. 
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the state constitution since charter schools do not have elected 
governing bodies.106   
Legislation that authorizes charter schools is now almost 
universally found across the United States even though charter 
schools did not exist a quarter of a century ago.107  Currently, forty-
four states and the District of Columbia have charter school 
legislation.108  Charter schools are experiencing growth in the number 
of jurisdictions served as well as in both the number of operating 
schools and the number of students served.  Nationally, charter 
schools account for about 6,500 schools109 and serve well over 2.5 
million students110 with a near supermajority of charter schools 
reporting that they have students on a waiting list.111   
While there is some evidence that states have sought to slow the 
pace of charter school growth by caps or moratoriums,112 more states 
have started lifting caps on charter schools.113  Federal legislation and 
 
106.  See League of Women Voters v. Wash., No. 89714-0 (Wash. Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/897140.pdf. 
107.  Choice & Charter Schools: Laws & Legislation, THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, 
https://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016) (noting that Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Vermont, and West Virginia do not have charter school authorizing legislation). 
108.  Id. 
109.  School Choice & Education: By the Numbers, THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, 
https://www.edreform.com/2014/12/school-choice-education-by-the-numbers/ (last visi-
ted Feb. 18, 2016).  
110.  Id. 
111.  THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS, at 
3 (2010).  A more recent report, however, questions this waiting list data.  In particular, 
the report alleges that the waiting list data is suspect because the numbers are too 
exact, unverifiable and do not adjust for a lack of backfilling.  See KEVIN G. WELNER & 
GARY MIRON, WAIT! WAIT. DON’T MISLEAD ME!: NINE REASONS TO BE SKEPTICAL ABOUT 
CHARTER SCHOOL WAITLIST NUMBERS (2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/char
ter-wa itlists.pdf. 
112.  SCHOOLS, MEASURING UP: NO CAPS, http://www.publiccharters.org/law-data
base/caps/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (listing some states, such as Maine, restricting 
charter schools statewide to a total of ten within ten years). 
113.  THREE STATES LIFTING CHARTER CAPS?, AM. SCH. CHOICE, http://americansch
oolchoice.com/three-states-lifting-charter-caps/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (citing that 
more than half of states with charter school authorization legislation do not cap the 
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policy have also encouraged their expansion.  For example, then-
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan proclaimed that states that 
closed or limited charter schools’ growth would encounter barriers in 
the competitive “Race to the Top” grant114 application process.115  
Though some scholars argued that Race to the Top would not produce 
meaningful change due to political obstacles, it is unmistakably 
apparent that the federal pressure to enable charter schools was 
present and effective in the Race to the Top program.116  Attesting to 
this argument’s credibility is the fact that charter schools, while 
unproven in the areas of integration, and academic innovation and 
performance, receive significantly more money in the federal budget 
than do their more proven school choice counterparts—magnet 
schools.117  Charter schools are not a passing fad; they are a part of the 
American educational system and will likely remain so for the 
immediate future.  
Issues of race and equity crescendo concomitantly with the rise 
of charter schools.  Charter school students are more segregated than 
their traditional public school counterparts, an important measure of 
educational equity.118  Black charter school students are approxi-
 
number of operating charters, and three more states are considering lifting caps on 
the number of operating charter schools). 
114.  “Race to the Top” was perhaps President Barack Obama’s most important 
education policy prior to the recent passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act.  Race 
to the Top sought to select only a few states for large grants to improve student 
achievement.  In order to receive Race to the Top funds, states aspiring to the grant 
were required to adopt numerous items from the school reform agenda, including 
embracing school choice and teacher evaluations that embraced merit pay. 
115.  Arne Duncan, Education Reform’s Moon Shot, WASH. POST (July 24, 2009), 
http://www.ode.state.or.us/superintendent/yat/meetings/arne-duncan-announcing-
the-guidelines.pdf; Press Release, White House, States Open to Charters Start Fast in 
“Race to Top” (June 8, 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/0608
2009a.pdf. 
116.  Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive Grants and 
the Obama Educational Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 136, 152 (2012). 
117.  GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & ERICA FRANKENBERG, REVIVING MAGNET SCHOOLS: 
STRENGTHENING A SUCCESSFUL CHOICE OPTION 5 (2012). 
118.  See Iris C. Rotberg, Charter Schools and the Risk of Increased Segregation, 95 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 28 (2014); Erica Frankenberg et al., supra note 102; David R. Garcia, The 
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mately twice as likely to attend a charter school that is 90–100% 
minority as their counterparts are likely to attend a similar traditional 
public school.119  Erica Frankenberg and her colleagues found that half 
of Latino students in charter schools attended such apartheid 
schools.120  Similarly, more than two of every five Black charter school 
students attended a school that was almost exclusively students of 
color.121  These statistics are dismaying, at best, because higher 
concentrations of minority students are statistically connected to 
poorer educational, social and occupational opportunities, due in part 
to the availability of fewer human and financial resources.122 
The continued proliferation of charter schools in minority-
populated areas aids in further segregation of charter school 
students.123  A 2010 study commissioned by the Civil Rights Project 
found that many charter schools operate in predominately minority 
areas and result in disproportionate minority subscription.124  Other 
studies corroborate the findings of the Civil Rights Project.125  These 
charter schools often start with idealistic and noble missions: to 
provide high-quality and equitable education to low-income, 
minority students.126  The report from the Civil Rights Project, though 
attacked for its methodology,127 identified charter schools as hyper-
 
Impact of School Choice on Racial Segregation in Charter Schools, 22 EDUC. POL’Y 805 
(2007); Yongmei Ni, Are Charter Schools More Racially Segregated than Traditional Public 
Schools?, 30 POL’Y REP. 6 (2007). 
119.  FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 82, at 6–7. 
120.  Id. at 26. 
121.  Id. 
122.  See RICHARD KAHLENBERG, BROOKINGS INST., ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MI-
DDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE (2001). 
123.  FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 82. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Rotberg, supra note 118; Garcia, supra note 118; Ni, supra note 118. 
126.  See A SURVEY REPORT ON EDUCATION REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND THE DESIRE 
FOR PARENTAL CHOICE, in THE BLACK COMMUNITY, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR EDUC. OPTIONS 
(2013), http://scoter.baeo.org/news_multi_media/20130723-Survey%20Reort-EW%5B9%
5D.pdf. 
127.  Gary W. Ritter, Nathan C. Jensen, Brian Kisida & Daniel H. Bowen, Choosing 
Charter Schools: How Does Parental Choice Affect Racial Integration (Nat’l Ctr. for the 
Study of Privatization in Educ., Working Paper 2012) (on file with author).  
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segregated as well hyper-isolated.128  Even detractors of Choice 
Without Equity found that charter schools were more segregated than 
traditional public schools, although those same individuals 
questioned the extent and importance of racial segregation in charter 
schools.129  Even assuming, arguendo, that the detractors are correct—
charter schools are less segregated than leading research suggests—it 
is problematic that charter schools are more segregated than 
traditional public schools, which are themselves in a period of high 
segregation, especially if segregation is linked to lower student 
achievement.130  Of course, this line of argument assumes that families 
who are racial and/or ethnic minorities are not self-segregating.  A 
rebuking of self-segregation is a simple euphemism for telling parents 
who are racial and/or ethnic minorities how to best raise their 
children, a slippery slope of replacing parental decision-making on 
where and how to educate children from predominately minority 
populations. 
Charter schools, despite their issues with segregation, have 
found tremendous support in minority communities.  In a 2010 
survey conducted by Harvard’s Program on Educational Policy 
Governance and Education Next, a near supermajority of Black 
Americans supported charter schools while less than one in six Black 
Americans opposed charter schools.131  Nationally, the number of 
supporters of charter schools is well short of half for all races 
combined.132  The apparent affinity of Black Americans for charter 
schools is reasonable given their potential benefits.133  Scholars have 
argued that charter schools—rather than traditional public schools—
 
128.  FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 82. 
129.  Ritter et al., supra note 127 (oscillating between city-based and metropolitan-
based data to reach a conclusion that students in the Little Rock Metropolitan area 
are only slightly more racially isolated in charter schools).  
130.  ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 78. 
131.  WILLIAM HOWELL, MARTIN WEST & PAUL E. PETERSON, MEETING OF THE MINDS 
23 (2011), http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_2010_Survey_Article.pdf (finding 
that sixty-four percent of Black Americans support charter schools and only fourteen 
percent oppose). 
132.  Id. 
133.  ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 78. 
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may more effectively serve the needs of Black and Brown students.134  
Preston Green, of the University of Connecticut and Julie Mead, of the 
University of Wisconsin, leading scholars on school reform and civil 
rights, also highlighted the following potential benefits: charter 
schools are able to adopt educational themes that specifically address 
the educational needs of students of color, have small school sizes, 
and are more flexible in hiring teachers.135  While some scholars have 
emphasized the negative and uncertain effects of charter schools,136 
Black and Brown parents, key stakeholders in movements for 
educational equity, appear to be choosing charter schools when that 
option is available.137   
Given the resilient public relations teams supporting charter 
schools, it is not surprising that they are perceived as benefitting 
minority and low-income stakeholders.  Pro-charter school 
organizations have convinced the general public that parental choice 
is a civil right.138  This perspective combined with prevailing 
 
134.  See Preston C. Green, III, Preventing School Desegregation Decrees From Becom-
ing Barriers to Charter School Innovation, 144 EDUC. L. REP. 15 (2000); see also Robin 
Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375 
(1997). 
135.  See PRESTON C. GREEN & JULIE MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE LAW: ESTABLISH-
ING NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (2004). 
136.  See Preston C. Green, III, Erica Frankenberg, Steven L. Nelson & Julie Rowland, 
Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are the Rights of Students of 
Color Sufficiently Protected? 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 253 (2012); Erica 
Frankenberg, Charter Schools: A Civil Rights Mirage? 47 KAPPA DELTA PI REC. 100 (2011) 
[hereinafter A Civil Rights Mirage]; Pamela Frazier-Anderson, Public Schooling in Post-
Hurricane Katrina New Orleans: Are Charter Schools the Solution or Part of the Problem? 93 J. 
AFR.-AM. HIST. 410 (2008); Luis Miron, The Urban School Crisis in New Orleans: Pre- and Post-
Katrina Perspectives, 13 J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK 238 (2008). 
137.  HOWELL ET AL., supra note 131 (This study may be less accurate a picture in 
New Orleans since nearly all of New Orleans’s public schools are now charter 
schools); see generally NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., MARKET SHARE REPORT 
(2013), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Market-Share-
Report-2013.pdf (New Orleans has since chartered most of its remaining traditional 
public schools although not all public schools in the city are charter schools). 
138.  Jennifer Jacobs, Ted Cruz in Iowa: School Choice is “Civil Rights Issue,” DES 
MOINES REG. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/20
14/03/18/texas-republican-ted-cruz-speaks-to-iowa-homeschool-families; Joan Kele-
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narratives of failing public schools, dating back to A Nation at Risk,139 
has resulted in an attack on traditional public schools as being 
ineffective at their primary mission: educating students.  The 
narrative of failing public schools has been targeted to specifically 
address the failure to educate perhaps the most vulnerable student 
populations: low-income and minority students.   
Advocates for these students, unable to overcome the obstacles 
to educational equity that the Supreme Court constructed in Milliken, 
have now sought to overcome Milliken through methods that might 
result in or ignore the problems of segregated schools.  This focus has 
been predominately on providing low-income and minority students 
access to quality schools or equal educational opportunity, regardless 
of the school’s status as segregated, desegregated or integrated.  The 
Milliken I decision effectively banned the incorporation of suburban 
districts in the desegregation efforts of urban districts because it could 
not be proven that suburban districts or the state produced policies 
that resulted in the segregation of schools.140  The result of Milliken I 
was that desegregation was improbable, if not impossible, due to the 
lack of a sufficient number of White students to facilitate 
desegregation.   
This “new civil right,” school choice, has been framed as a self-
actualization mechanism.141  Beyond being such a mechanism, others 
 
her, Parental Choice Is A Civil Rights Issue, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2013-04-02/opinion/chi-20130402-keleher_briefs_1_school-vouchers-
parental-choice-other-school-choice-options; Reverend H. K. Matthews, Alabama Account-
ability Act’s Parental Choice is an Extension of the Civil Rights Movement, AL.COM (Aug. 25, 
2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/08/alabama_accountability_
acts_pa.html; Michelle Bernard, School Choice is the Most Critical Civil Rights Issue of Our 
Time: It’s the Modern Extension of Brown v. Board of Education, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011, 
12:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/02 /01/school-choice-is-the-
most-critical-civil-rights-issue-of-our-time; Support Parental Choice in Education is Our 
Civil Right, STAR LEDGER (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.nj.com/opinion/times/oped/index.
ssf?/base/news-0/1264315512 205100.xml&coll=5 [hereinafter Support Parental Choice]. 
139.  NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., A NATION AT 
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). 
140.  Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746–47.  
141.  Keleher, supra note 138; Bernard, supra note 138. 
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suggest that school choice might be the pathway to the American 
Dream and, perhaps more importantly, move the nation towards 
admirable goals of “inclusion, integration and tolerance.”142  Despite 
claims alleging the civil rights roots of the charter school movement 
being pushed to the forefront of discussions about education in the 
United States, little attention has been paid to the impact of this “new 
civil right” on existing rights, at least through a critical lens.143  For 
instance, school desegregation and voting rights were part and parcel 
of the civil rights movement.  Well before Brown I, starting in 1950 
with Sweatt and McLaurin, civil rights advocates fought to exorcise the 
“separate but equal” doctrine espoused in Plessy and integrate public 
schools in the United States when it became clear that segregated 
schools were inherently not equal.  Similarly, civil rights advocates 
have long thought that securing Blacks the right to the electoral 
franchise—and simultaneously, the right to political participation—
was prominent.144  The charter school movement has seemingly 
forgotten about, or perhaps ignored, the importance of these battles 
in the movement’s efforts to stage a new civil rights agenda: quality, 
yet segregated education—in other words, separate, but equal 
education.145  Although there is no true or uniform national definition 
of the term “charter school,” charter schools are generally thought to 
be privately operated, yet publicly funded schools that contract with 
a state to provide greater academic results in exchange for greater 
autonomy.146  Charter school research has been generally confined to 
consternations of student achievement147 and student racial 
 
142.  Bernard, supra note 138. 
143.  Scott, supra note 99, at 32–52. 
144.  See Gabrielle Chin, The Voting Rights Act of 1867: The Constitutionality of 
Federal Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581 (2004). 
145.  Jacobs, supra note 138; Keleher, supra note 138; Matthews, supra note 138; 
Bernard, supra note 138; Support Parental Choice, supra note 138; see also Derek Black, 
Civil Rights, Charter Schools and Lessons to be Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1769–72 
(2012) (Scholars, however, continue to consider the efficacy of charter schools to 
deliver universal educational equity and academic achievement).   
146.  GREEN & MEAD, supra note 135. 
147.  Black, supra note 145. 
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composition and segregation.148  Although scholars are starting to 
focus more on charter school board composition and 
representation,149 very little, if any, scholarship exists that explores the 
legal constructions that require board selection procedures based on 
accountability, particularly when contrasting self-selected boards 
against directly elected school boards’ accountability in the context of 
school closures.  If charter schools are given more autonomy than 
traditional public schools in exchange for higher accountability, 
scholars must determine how accountability, however it is defined, is 
best achieved.  This investigation is made more paramount by the fact 
that charter schools enroll disproportionately poor and minority 
student bodies—often times resulting in double segregation.150  Where 
poverty and segregation are strongly correlated with diminished 
academic achievement, multi-segregated students comprise our 
nation’s most vulnerable student population.151  This remainder of this 
Article explores the relationship between appointed charter school 
boards who operate under the supervision of popularly elected school 
boards and appointed charter school boards who operate without the 
supervision of popularly elected school boards. 
 
III.  Problematizing Public Charter School Management:  
        Favoring Appointed, Predominantly White Charter  
        School Boards over Elected, Diverse Boards 
 
At least one study has found that self-selected charter school 
boards in New Orleans are predominately and disproportionately 
White.152  While some researchers suggest that the changes in the 
 
148.  See generally Erica Frankenberg et al., supra note 102. 
149.  See MELISSA STONE ET AL., HUBERT H. HUMPHREY INST. OF PUB. AFF., CHARTER 
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY: RESEARCH PILOT STUDY REPORT (2012); see also Nelson, supra note 6; but 
see Roch & Pitts, supra note 85 (finding better links between better student outcomes 
and less traditional educational approaches, not including board representation). 
150.  A Civil Rights Mirage, supra note 136. 
151.  ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 78, at 5–8. 
152.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
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number of boards and the composition of those new boards impact 
the voting rights of Black parents153 and the academic outcomes of 
students,154 other scholars question whether charter school board 
representation has a significant impact on student achievement.155  
Notwithstanding those debates, it is important to address how state 
constitutional construction and interpretation affect greater academic 
accountability, a stated goal of the charter school movement.156  
Charter school advocates assert that New Orleans’s public 
charter school boards are seeking diversity, but these boards report 
very little emphasis on specifically achieving racial diversity.  In a 
recent survey of all charter schools operating in the city of New 
Orleans in the 2012-2013 school year, only nine boards responded to 
requests for information on board composition, reflecting the private 
and insular nature of charter schools.157  Only six of the nine boards 
answered questions regarding recruitment efforts for racial minority 
board members.  Only three self-selected charter school boards in 
New Orleans reported efforts at recruiting racial minorities onto 
charter school boards.  Of the three boards reporting minority 
recruitment activities, only one explicitly mentioned diversity, and 
did so in broad terms.  Diversity efforts were the last priority listed 
for this board.   
Two other boards did not directly mention minority recruitment.  
Those boards did, however, have structures in place that would 
recruit potential board members from racial minority backgrounds.  
 
153.  Nelson, supra note 6. 
154.  Nelson & Grace, supra note 85. 
155.  Id. (finding links between better student outcomes and more traditional 
educational approaches); Roch & Pitts, supra note 85, at 282–302 (2012) (finding links 
between better student outcomes and less traditional educational approaches, not 
including board representation). 
156.  Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District 
Act and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 128 (2007) (projecting that 
charter schools would become a significant policy initiative for school districts caught 
in the “accountability cycle,” a cycle in which forced choice implemented in response 
to school reform policies results in reduced ability to achieve meaningful reformation 
of struggling educational systems). 
157.  See infra Table 1.  
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One of these two boards is the most representative self-selected 
charter school board when compared to the racial compositions of the 
student body of the schools the board manages, the student 
population of New Orleans’s public schools, and the city’s voting age 
population.158  The limited data shows that charter schools were 
willing to share that self-selected boards—with policymaking and 
enforcement powers in New Orleans public schools—were 
predominately White boards that would effectively replace popularly 
elected, predominately Black school boards.159  Although the state of 
Louisiana made inappropriate requests from the federal government 
to relieve the state of some section 5 restrictions following Hurricane 
Katrina,160 the state has failed to return power to the popularly elected 
and predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.  In fact, it has 
done the opposite.   
The state has altered regulations to allow the disproportionately 
White, self-selected charter school boards to unilaterally decide when 
they will return to the Orleans Parish School Board’s supervision.161  
An enforceable section 5 would give Black citizens in New Orleans 
 
158.  Gaining Choice and Losing Voice, supra note 45, at 237–66 (The charter school 
board of Algiers Charter School Association was not statistically different than the 
voting age population of the city of New Orleans, the student population or the 
composition of the Orleans Parish School Board.  The charter school boards of the 
International School of Louisiana as well the Morris Jeff Community School were not 
statistically different than the student population or the composition of the Orleans 
Parish School Board, but was statistically different than the voting age population of 
the city of New Orleans.  Both the International School of Louisiana and the Morris 
Jeff Community School are as disproportionately non-Black as compared to the 
student population of New Orleans Public Schools); see also Nelson, supra note 6. 
159.  Gaining Choice and Losing Voice, supra note 45, at 237–66. 
160.  See Damian Williams, Reconstructing Section 5: A Post-Katrina Proposal for Vot-
ing Rights Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116 (2007) (discussing how section 5 was not robust 
enough to account for the situation that Hurricane Katrina introduced to the 
predominately Black (sixty-seven percent) city of New Orleans). 
161.  Danielle Dreilinger, Second Recovery Charter Votes to Return to Orleans Parish 
System (Jan. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/01/second_
recovery_charter_votes.html (explaining that nearly ten years after Hurricane Katrina 
enabled the charter school takeover of New Orleans’s public schools, only two of thirty-
four “recovered” schools have elected to return to the system that is electorally 
accountable to the parents of New Orleans’s predominately Black public school students). 
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the tools for challenging the indefinite replacement of its elected 
school board with self-selected, predominately White boards created 
to run parallel, or even above, the predominately Black, elected school 
board.  This is exactly the scenario that section 5 was designed to 
address. 
Self-selected charter school boards in Louisiana, and more 
particularly New Orleans, are relatively unaccountable to any 
immediately affected stakeholders.  The state of Louisiana has offered 
charter schools more autonomy in exchange for greater 
accountability, but very little accountability actually exists, especially 
for charter schools operating in the state’s largest predominately 
Black city.  There are numerous instances of the lack of supervision 
and accountability from the state of Louisiana for New Orleans’s 
charter schools.  For instance, during a federal hearing for P.B. v. 
Pastorek, the litigator for the state of Louisiana admitted that it had 
failed to effectively monitor New Orleans charter schools’ compliance 
with special education requirements.162  Additionally, Louisiana’s 
former governor Bobby Jindal’s administration has been charged with 
sharing charter school data regarding achievement with only those 
researchers who support the charter school movement.163   
More immediately, New Orleans charter schools routinely 
decline to respond to information requests from the public.  
Specifically, they have refused to answer questions regarding board 
composition and efforts to recruit board members from diverse racial 
backgrounds in this study.  Some boards responded that they lacked 
either the time or resources to discover the racial composition of their 
 
162.  Interview by Steven L. Nelson with Jessica L. Carter, former Outreach 
Paralegal, Southern Poverty Law Center, in New Orleans, La. (Mar. 31, 2015). 
163.  Mercedes Schneider, Good News, Transparency: Louisiana CREDO Data No 
Longer Exclusive to Credo (Apr. 5, 2015), https://deutsch29.wordpress.com/ 2015/04/05/
good-news-transparency-louisiana-credo-data-no-longer-exclusive-to-credo/. 
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boards and make efforts to assure the diversity of those boards.164  
Other boards expressed a fear of discussing race.165   
The experience with New Orleans charter schools’ lack of 
accountability and transparency is not isolated to southeast 
Louisiana.  There is a growing body of literature addressing the lack 
of accountability for charter schools in the United States because of a 
general lack of transparency.166  The general lack of transparency, as 
well as the lack of supervision surrounding self-selected boards’ 
expenditure of public funds is troubling from an ethical standpoint.  
Moreover, it is important to understand the impact of the charter 
school movement on accountability, which is the primary argument 
for the expansion of such schools.  If charter schools are no more 
accountable than traditional public schools, there is no real need for 
them.  The next Section will examine whether more or less direct 
accountability to voters produces more overall accountability by way 
of comparing two former section 5 jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
 
164.  While time is a precious resource, charter school boards had well over four 
months to answer any of three emails regarding this matter.  It is at least ironic that a board 
that had the time to inform the surveyer of its inability to answer a survey because of time 
constraints could respond in detail with the reasons for failing to answer the questions 
posed on the survey.  There was apparently time to answer the researcher’s email, but not 
the questions posed (which could generally be answered with one sentence answers or 
producing an already existing document). 
165.  It is important to note the difficulty often involved in discussing race in the 
United States; however, the students enrolled in New Orleans’s public charter 
schools—who are ninety percent Black—are unable to ignore the fact that they are 
Black. 
166.  See THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & THE ALL. TO RECLAIM OUR SCH., THE 
TIP OF THE ICEBERG: CHARTER SCHOOL VULNERABILITIES TO WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE 
(2015), http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Charter-Schools-National-Re
port_rev2.pdf; see also THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & THE COAL. FOR CMTY. SCH., 
SYSTEM FAILURE: LOUISIANA’S BROKEN CHARTER SCHOOL LAW (2015), http://education
votes.nea.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Charter-Schools-Louisiana-Report_web2.pdf; 
see also Susan DeJarnatt, Keep Following the Money: Financial Account-ability and 
Governance of Cyber Charter Schools, 45 URB. LAW. 915 (2013). 
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IV.  State Protections of the Electoral Franchise in Local  
        School Board Elections: Disparities in Louisiana  
        and Florida 
 
The entire state of Louisiana and some portions of the state of 
Florida were under section 5 coverage before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Shelby County.167  Therefore, any and all electoral changes 
in any jurisdiction in the state of Louisiana and all electoral changes 
in some jurisdictions in the state of Florida required preclearance from 
the federal government before those electoral changes could take 
place.  In essence, section 5 of the Act protected all Black voters in 
Louisiana and some Black voters in Florida from voting power 
dilution. 
Black voters in the state of Louisiana and the state of Florida, 
however, were ostensibly covered under state constitutional 
protections requiring the election of local school boards when the 
Court issued the Shelby County decision.  State constitutional 
provisions did not protect Black voters in Louisiana; however, they 
did protect Black voters in Florida.  The remainder of this Article will 
discuss the impact of these state constitutional decisions on the ability 
and political will to hold charter schools accountable in each state. 
The Louisiana state constitution requires that the state legislature 
establish popularly elected school boards in each parish168 of the state 
of Louisiana.169  Subsection 9(A) of Article 8 states that “the legislature 
shall create parish school boards and provide for the election of their 
members.”170  In Triplett et al. v. Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education and Louisiana Department of Education,171 a Louisiana Court 
of Appeal addressed whether the Louisiana constitution allowed for 
 
167.  ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE ACT, supra note 16. 
168.  Parishes are the Louisiana political subdivision equivalent of a county in 
other states. 
169.  LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9, cl. A. 
170.  LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9, cl. A. 
171.  Triplett v. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 21 So. 3d 401 (La. App. Ct., 
2009). 
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the state legislature to establish nonelected, parallel school boards 
within some, but not all, parishes.  Analyzing Article VIII § (9)(A) of 
the Louisiana constitution, the Louisiana state appellate court held 
that the state may establish alternate, nonelected school boards so 
long as the state established the required elected school boards.172  In 
particular, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs in the case needed to 
identify a specific constitutional provision that bars—or otherwise 
limits—the state legislature from enacting the law at issue.173  The 
court ruled that the provisions of the state constitution are limitations, 
as opposed to grants of permission, on the otherwise plenary powers 
granted to the states.174  After Triplett, nonelected school boards were 
permitted in Louisiana.  Thus, the legislature was free to create school 
boards with any variety of selection schemes.  Not only are school 
boards allowed to be statewide with an appointed board; these 
additional school boards are allowed to be self-selected if the state 
legislature deemed such selections appropriate. 
The state legislature exercised improper power in establishing 
the Recovery School District—a statewide school district with an 
appointed governing board according to the state court.175  Louisiana, 
in ratifying its constitution, made great efforts to protect the right of 
local citizens to manage, control and supervise public schools; 
Louisiana citizens thought this protection so important that the 
protection was placed in the state’s constitution.176  The court’s 
decision in Triplett may seem logical when considering the schools 
were taken over by the Recovery School District in 2009.177  The 
Recovery School District took control of only eight schools in Baton 
 
172.  Triplett, 21 So. 3d at 405. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
177.  The schools prompting the state constitutional challenge in Triplett are located 
in East Baton Rouge Parish, the seat of state government.  At that time, only a small portion 
of East Baton Rouge Parish’s schools would be under the control of the state’s appointed 
school board if the state were allowed to take over the soon-to-be affected schools in East 
Baton Rouge Parish. 
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Rouge at that time.178  Even this minimal encroachment on local 
control prompted a legal challenge that was entertained by the state 
courts.179  The court’s reasoning that the Louisiana constitution does 
not forbid the creation of additional, nonelected school boards loses 
its credibility—if not its rationality—in the context of New Orleans 
public schools.   
In the New Orleans context, the Recovery School District seized 
nearly every school and nearly every student under control of the 
popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board.180  The 
constitutionally mandated and popularly elected Orleans Parish 
School Board maintained very little authority over the schools in 
Orleans Parish.  The court might be perceived as having approved of 
the takeover circumstances in New Orleans although it was not tasked 
with resolving New Orleans’s scenario.  Whatever the case, the court’s 
conclusions as applied to New Orleans appear outlandishly absurd.  
The state must establish elected parish-level school boards.181  These 
school boards can, however, have little or no political power to 
operate and manage the parish’s schools or any substantial 
proportion of the parish’s schools.182  It appears that the requirement 
to have elected school boards is a mere formality and requires only 
the illusion of power over education policy or involvement in the 
politics of education.  Such a conclusion may, in fact, be barred by 
rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation in Louisiana.183   
The Recovery School District assumed direct supervision of a few 
schools in Baton Rouge; the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, an 
elected school board, still exercised considerable power of policy and 
 
178.  Triplett, 21 So. 3d at 405. 
179.  Id. at 405–06. 
180.  Holley-Walker, supra note 156, at 128. 
181.  Triplett, 21 So. 3d at 413. 
182.  Id. at 410. 
183.  Article 9 of the Louisiana Civil Code mandates that statutes be construed in a 
manner that is sensical (see Fontenot v. Chevron, 676 So. 2d 557 (1996)).  It is at least arguable 
that to require elected school boards to govern parish schools, but also allow more 
powerful boards that are not elected to govern a greater portion of those same schools is 
absurd.  In this case, what is the function of a constitutionally required school board that 
can exercise little or no power over the jurisdiction’s school? 
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politics.  This was not the case in New Orleans, where the popularly 
elected school board has little to no power over policy and politics.  
Moreover, the Recovery School District chartered many of the 
takeover schools in New Orleans.184  In chartering the schools, the 
Louisiana state legislature and the Recovery School District granted 
the self-appointed school boards the right to determine if those 
schools would ever return to the Orleans Parish School Board’s 
supervision, where the schools might be more accountable to New 
Orleans’s voters.185  More than ten years after the state takeover, only 
two school boards have agreed to return the popularly elected and 
predominately Black local school board.186  Recently, two additional 
schools have agreed to “conditionally return” to public 
accountability.187 
Just as the state courts in Louisiana have confronted legislative 
attempts at establishing parallel school boards in school districts, the 
state courts of Florida have also confronted these issues.  In Duval 
County School Board v. State Board of Education,188 a Florida state 
appellate court found legislative attempts to install a separate 
statewide authorizer of charter schools a violation of the state 
constitution.189  According to the constitution of the state of Florida, 
district school boards are required to be elected190 and are required to 
“operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the 
 
184.  Miron, supra note 136, at 244–46. 
185.  Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery Schools Back to Orleans Parish? House Panel Says 
OK, 9-8 (May 12, 2015, 6:41 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/
05/bill_returning_rsd_schools_to.html (discussing the Louisiana state legislatures 
debate over returning adequately performing, previously state-taken over schools to 
local and elected control). 
186.  Dreilinger, supra note 161. 
187.  Danielle Dreilinger, 2 more Recovery Schools to Return to Orleans Parish – Maybe, 
(Feb. 11, 2016, 10:26 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2016/02/new_begin
nings_return_opsb.html (discussing the conditional vote of a New Orleans charter board 
to return its eligible schools to control of the popularly elected schools board). 
188.  998 So. 2d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
189.  Id.  
190.  FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a). 
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school district.”191  In 2006, the Florida state legislature passed section 
1002.335 of the Florida Statutes.192  This provision created the “Florida 
Schools of Excellence Commission,” which operated as an 
independent, state-run agency with the authority to approve charter 
schools throughout the state.193   
Section 1002.335 effectively displaced popularly elected school 
boards throughout the state of Florida with an appointed, state-run 
body as authorizers and supervisors of charter schools within district 
boundaries.194  The state of Florida could and did allow some 
popularly elected school boards to remain the exclusive authorizers 
and supervisors of charter schools in certain districts.195  Under section 
1002.335, this privilege could only be extended if the state of Florida 
deemed the decision to be appropriate.196  Multiple popularly elected 
school boards, including the Duval County School Board, challenged 
the state’s decision to deny the exclusivity of control of all schools, 
including charter schools in their respective school districts, on the 
grounds that section 1002.335 was facially unconstitutional and 
violated Article 9 of the Florida Constitution. 
The Florida appellate court hearing the case agreed with the 
popularly elected district school boards.  The state constitution 
explicitly restricted the ability of the state legislature to create school 
boards.  The court reasoned, “Section 1002.335 provide[d] for the 
creation of charter schools throughout Florida.  The state permitt[ed] 
and encourage[d] the creation of a parallel system of free public 
education escaping the operation and control of local elected 
boards.”197  Moreover, the new statute specifically bestowed the 
powers reserved for popularly elected school boards upon the newly 
appointed state-run board.198   
 
191.  FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b). 
192.  Duval Cty., 998 So. 2d at 642. 
193.  Id.  
194.  Duval Cty., 998 So. 2d at 642–44. 
195.  Id. at 642. 
196.  Id.  
197.  Duval Cty., 998 So. 2d at 643. 
198.  Id.  
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The court did not find the state’s arguments in support of the 
legislation persuasive.199  The state argued that section 1002.335 would 
further the constitutionally mandated uniform system of schools and 
the equity interest of charter schools, while affecting a marginal 
portion of the total school market share in Florida’s public schools.200  
The court also did not find persuasive the argument that the Florida 
Department of Education could grant permission for school districts 
to remain the sole operator of all schools in the district.201  In 
particular, the court expressed concern that the same statute that 
allowed the state to grant school districts permission to remain the 
exclusive operators, controllers and supervisors of all public schools 
simultaneously granted the authority to strip such districts’ powers.202   
The effect of the statute was to disallow constitutionally required, 
popularly elected school boards to have exclusive authority over all 
schools in their respective districts; instead, popularly elected school 
boards could only serve as agents for the state of Florida in achieving 
the state’s agenda.203  If school boards did not comply with the state’s 
wishes, the state could presumably force acquiescence by threatening 
to remove the school board’s authority to supervise the district’s 
charter schools. 
 
A. Comparing and Contrasting Minority Voter Protection in 
School Board Elections in Louisiana and Florida 
 
The states of Louisiana and Florida both have constitutional 
requirements to establish popularly elected county or parish-level 
school boards.  Different constitutional interpretations have led to 
varying results in locals’ abilities to advance political and policy 
agendas pertaining to education.  The Louisiana state constitution 
does not require that all boards be elected.  Certainly, the state must 
establish the constitutionally mandated school boards, but the state 
 
199.  Duval Cty., 998 So. 2d at 644. 
200.  Id. at 643–44. 
201.  Id. at 644. 
202.  Id.  
203.  Id. 
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may also choose to establish alternative, parallel-running school 
boards.204  Florida’s constitution requires that all school boards be 
elected and that those elected school boards be the only governing 
body responsible for the education of each district’s schools and 
students; thus, the state may not establish alternate school boards that 
are equivalent or superior in power to the elected, countywide school 
board.205  Louisiana and Florida—aside from merely sharing 
constitutional requirements to elect school boards—are particularly 
unique among former section 5-covered jurisdictions.  Only Louisiana 
and Florida, of all states with any section 5-covered jurisdictions, have 
constitutionally mandated voting protections pertaining to school 
board elections. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby County, while not 
purportedly a case about primary and secondary education, has 
substantial implications for school board selection processes.  In 
particular, section 5-covered jurisdictions would have been required 
to seek preclearance from the federal government to install school 
board selection processes aside from elections in Louisiana and 
Florida.  The Florida state courts have protected the voting rights of 
all, but particularly minority, voters in educational policy and politics 
by mandating that elected county school boards remain the only 
school boards in the state of Florida.  Although the protection of 
minority voters may not have been the intent of the Florida 
constitution, the effect of the state’s constitution is to maintain the 
ability of minority voters to control or influence education politics and 
policy in local school districts.  Thus, in Florida, charter school boards, 
which in some areas have been found to be disproportionately White, 
are still accountable to elected county school boards.  So long as 
minority voters are allowed to freely participate in school board 
elections, they will have some impact on education policy and politics.   
This is not the case in Louisiana.  Louisiana requires elected 
parish-wide school boards, but the state may establish parallel boards 
with substantially more power than the elected parish-wide school 
 
204.  Triplett, 21 So. 3d at 405. 
205.  Duval Cty., 998 So. 2d 641. 
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board.  If the state legislature would prefer to not have a 
predominately Black, elected school board, then it can establish an 
alternative school board that is either appointed or self-selected.  If the 
Supreme Court had not thwarted the enforcement of section 5 by way 
of finding section 4 of the Act unconstitutional, the Louisiana state 
court’s decision might have been for naught.  Though Louisiana 
would maintain a state right to establish multiple school boards, that 
right would be restricted by the preemptive powers of section 5.  The 
federal government would have required the state to prove how it 
would protect minority political participation before allowing the 
state to unilaterally install an appointed or self-selected, 
predominately White school board in lieu of an elected, 
predominately Black school board. 
While many scholars may discuss the implications of Shelby 
County on national and statewide elections, municipal and county-
level elections, arguably, more directly impact the lives of most voters.  
School boards, in particular, are perhaps the institution in the United 
States most similar to direct democracy; thus, school board elections 
are of great import to the analysis of the potential impacts of the 
Court’s decision in Shelby County.  While investigating the impact on 
the election of national and statewide office has great merit, 
examining the potential impacts of the Court’s most recent case for 
the protection of minority voting rights in the most local of elections 
is imperative for multiple reasons.   
First, the method by which national and state officials are 
appointed is generally well-prescribed.  The circumstances when state 
or national officials are to be appointed are also generally limited to 
specific officials who are generally not the ultimate or sole originators 
and implementers of policies.  This fact pattern might remain in the 
case of appointed school boards, but charter school boards have even 
less electoral accountability than appointed school boards.  Charter 
school boards are practically self-selected, which might restrict the 
ability of charter school boards to remain accountable in a manner that 
satisfies the charter school board’s promise of more accountability in 
exchange for more autonomy.  It is important, then, to assess the 
impact of different structures of accountability for self-selected 
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charter school boards.  The remainder of this Article will discuss 
potential issues created by the Court’s decision in Shelby County and 
the state court decisions in Louisiana and Florida. 
 
B. Collapsing a House of Cards: Issues at the Intersection of 
Shelby County, Triplett and Duval County 
 
The small differences in constitutional language and 
interpretations between Louisiana and Florida have substantial 
differences in how accountable charter schools may or may not be to 
constituents in each state.  These differences are not merely semantic 
in nature.  All charter school boards—although appointed or self-
selected—in the state of Florida are granted autonomy.  However, 
within that autonomy, these boards are still accountable—though to 
what extent, is debatable—to the popularly elected county school 
boards of the state of Florida.  On the contrary, only some appointed 
or self-selected charter school boards in Louisiana are held 
accountable to popularly elected parish school boards; this occurs if, 
and only if, those self-selected charter school boards seek the 
accountability of the popularly elected parish school boards in 
Louisiana since charter school boards may be granted operational 
permission through the appointed statewide school district if they do 
not want the popularly elected school board to oversee the operations 
of the charter school.206  
 The aforementioned differences in constitutional construction 
and interpretation are not just technical.  On its face, the fact that 
Florida’s charter schools are required to operate within the confines 
 
206.  The irony in the context of New Orleans is that the charter schools under 
the control of the popularly elected Orleans Parish Public Schools are those least likely 
to be academically unsatisfactory since the schools left under the control of the elected 
school board are the schools that 1) were academically exceptional prior to the state 
takeover, 2) those schools that have recovered to academically acceptable levels and 
have voted amongst their self-appointed board to leave the Recovery School District 
and return to the Orleans Parish School Board, or 3) have been recently approved by 
the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board, which only recently regained the 
right to charter schools in the city of New Orleans. 
4 NELSON_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2016  8:04 PM 
Summer 2016] KILLING TWO ACHIEVEMENTS WITH ONE STONE 265 
of an existing school district framework seems to afford more 
accountability to Florida’s electors than Louisiana’s charter schools, 
which may select to—but are not required to—operate within an 
existing school district’s framework.  To some extent, it could be 
argued that citizens in Florida may hold charter school boards to 
greater accountability since they may politically pressure elected 
school boards to open, close, or alter existing charter schools.  In 
contrast, in Louisiana, parents may only have this option if charter 
schools opt to give parents that option; such a result flies in the face 
of concepts of accountability.  Parents in Louisiana may elect to vote 
with their feet, but given the accountability structure—or lack thereof 
in Louisiana—that parent might well find him or herself in the same 
or worse position even after exercising their right to vote.   
Take the following reasoning as evidence supporting this 
hypothesis.  The state of Florida closes a higher percentage of charter 
schools than Louisiana.  Although state accountability structures vary 
greatly, it cannot be dismissed that Florida’s charter schools are 
typically higher performing than those in Louisiana (as defined by 
each respective state).  In support of this argument is the fact that each 
state establishes the criteria by which a school could be considered 
“low performing” or “failing.”  The state of Florida has closed roughly 
thirty percent of its charter schools,207 while Louisiana has closed only 
about nineteen percent of its charter schools.208  If charter schools gain 
autonomy in exchange for greater accountability, then states should 
be closing low-performing schools or academically unacceptable 
schools.209  Florida appears to close a greater proportion of its charter 
 
207.  Jacob Carpenter, Part 1 – Florida’s Failed Charter Schools: Cracks in the System, 
NAPLE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 13, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/
education/part-1---floridas-failed-charter-schools-cracks-in-the-system-ep-59572009
1-340772961.html. 
208.  CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN LOUISI-
ANA 11 (2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/la_report2013_7_26_2013_final.
pdf (on file with author). 
209.  For purposes of this Article, low-performing schools are considered schools 
with the grade of C or below.  Academically unacceptable schools are schools with 
the grade of D or F. 
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schools than does Louisiana210 despite the fact that Louisiana (eighty-
two percent)211 has a greater portion of low-performing charter 
schools when compared to Florida (thirty-eight percent).212   
Likewise, Louisiana (forty-two percent)213 has a greater portion of 
its charter schools that are academically unacceptable than does 
Florida (seventeen percent).214  It follows, then, that if Louisiana has a 
larger number of charter schools at risk of failing academically, it 
should be closing more charter schools than Florida, which has a far 
smaller proportion of struggling charter schools.  Though the 
comparisons of proportions do little in the way of suggesting 
causation, the marked differences (and correlation) in the ultimate 
accountability measurement—school closure—may warrant further 
investigation into the effects of district supervision on charter school 
accountability.215 
 
V.  Conclusions and Implications for the Creation and  
      Implementation of Charter School Legislation  
      Concerning Governance and its Relation to   
      Accountability 
 
The decisions of many parties, as well as the interaction of the 
consequences of those decisions, dictate policies.  In the United States, 
 
210.  Louisiana school performance data is reported as of the 2013-2014 school 
year while Louisiana school closure data is reported from the 2010-2011 school year.  
Florida school performance data is reported as of the 2012-2013 school year, while 
Florida school closure data is reported as of the 2013-2014 school year.  Thus, 
accountability comparisons may be slightly skewed.  Given the inability to access 
public data regarding school closures, this is the best available consideration. 
211.  LA. DEP’T EDUC., RAISING THE BAR: LOUISIANA TYPE 2, 4, AND 5 CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 2014-2015 ANNUAL REPORT 13–19 (2014), https://www.louisianabelieves.
com/docs/default-source/school-choice/2014-2015-charter-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
212.  FLA. DEP’T EDUC., FLORIDA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS: FACT SHEETS (2014), http://
www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7696/urlt/fast_facts_charter _schools.pdf. 
213.  LA. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 211. 
214.  FLA. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 212. 
215.  See infra Table 2 (illustrating the statistical test used to determine correction 
between state school board election requirements and charter school closures). 
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schools might have the largest cross-section of stakeholders, for they 
are one of few institutions in which nearly every citizen is required to 
participate in some manner.  There are very few exceptions to the rule 
that every citizen will participate in the educational system; as such, 
stakes are generally high in debates about education policy, even if 
voting in school board elections is generally low.216  Schools and 
schools board elections are local affairs, and if all politics are local, 
schools and school boards are perhaps the most local.  School board 
elections are relatively inexpensive217 and even candidates with little 
political experience or an unrecognizable name can rise to power with 
ease in the right context.  These scenarios may lead to one’s cousin, 
neighbor, or even a child’s soccer coach becoming a local political 
figure via the school board. 
On the other side of the school boards’ refreshingly local 
influence is the increasingly demanding guidance of the federal 
government.  Many scholars have noted that the federal government 
has tied incentives to accountability measures and “objective” results; 
this same federal intervention pressures states to adopt school choice 
policies.218  Moreover, the rise in these accountability measures and 
the concomitant rise of reliance on objective results has resulted in a 
decrease in public schools that are governed by traditional, local 
school boards.219  It is important, therefore, to assure that all schools 
and individuals who hold representative positions are actually being 
 
216.  See generally FREDERICK HESS, NAT’L SCH. BD. ASS’N, SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE 
DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY: CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES OF DISTRICT GOVERNANCE 
33 (2002), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED469432.pdf. 
217.  Id. at 35. 
218.  See generally Joseph P. Viteritti, The Federal Role in School Reform: Obama’s 
“Race to the Top,” 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2087 (2012); Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve 
Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and Racial Integration in the Age of 
Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 249 (2010); see generally David Hursh, Assessing No 
Child Left Behind and the Rise of Neoliberal Educaiton Policies, 44 AM. EDUC. RES. J. (2007); 
see also Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Truimph of School Choice 
over Racial Desegregation, GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95 (2005); Roslyn A. Mickelson, 
When Opting Out is Not a Choice: Implications for NCLB’s Transfer Option from Charlotte, 
North Carolina, 38 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. (2005). 
219.  See Holley-Walker, supra note 156. 
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held accountable.  Analyzing the differences between Louisiana, 
where relatively fewer charter schools are closed and more charter 
schools perform poorly, and Florida, where the situation is the 
opposite, provides some insight into developing legislation that 
authorizes charter schools in a manner that might increase 
accountability.  In sum, political pressure appears to be related to 
increased accountability. 
Lawyers are wordsmiths.  Judges might be the greatest of the 
wordsmiths.  The disparate opinions in Louisiana and Florida are to 
some extent semantic in nature.  The state court wordsmiths in each 
state treated the wording of constitutional provisions very differently.  
In Florida, the language of the state constitution made clear that 
countywide school boards should be elected and that schools should 
be the sole province of county school boards.  The same did not hold 
true in Louisiana where there was no restrictive language barring the 
creation of parallel school boards to run parallel to the constitutionally 
mandated, elected school board.   
As a result of the court’s analysis in Louisiana, Black voters have 
little, if any, power over education policy and politics in New Orleans.  
Those same voters, however, exercised great power in the areas of 
policy and politics prior to Hurricane Katrina.  The inability of Black 
voters to control education policy and politics in proportion to their 
political presence is not the only issue with the Louisiana court’s 
decision in Triplett.  Louisiana’s inability to hold charter schools 
accountable is a result of the state’s lack of reliable and inexpensive 
methods of accountability.  In a cash-strapped state like Louisiana,220 
having citizens patrol some issues may be more reliable and 
inexpensive since people are more likely to respond politically when 
an issue affects them personally, and especially where the state is 
required to run school board elections. 
 
220.  Jeff Guo, Louisiana So Poor That Bobby Jindal’s Budget Won’t Fund Presidential 
Primaries in 2016, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.washing tonpost.com/blogs/
govbeat/wp/2015/03/19/louisiana-is-so-poor-that-it-cant-afford-to-hold-presidential-
primaries-in-2016/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (revealing that Louisiana’s $1.6 billion 
budget gap was so large that the state could not afford to host some elections). 
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State legislatures, who have the power to create and amend 
legislation authorizing the operation of charter schools, should make 
concerted efforts to develop strategies that hold charter schools to 
account by way of political pressure from the general public while 
granting charter schools the autonomy to be innovative and flexible.  
Charter schools in Florida are directly accountable to the popularly 
elected county school board.  If county voters are unhappy with the 
progress or behavior of a charter school, the county school board must 
act to correct the charter school’s misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance.  If the county school board does not act according to the 
wishes of the county electors, the electors can unseat the obstinate 
county board member(s) during the next school board election.  This 
could be, but is often not, the case in Louisiana.   
If parents in New Orleans are unhappy with the actions or 
inactions of a charter school, the parents have very little recourse 
against the charter school.  Of course, parents can always remove their 
children from the charter schools in New Orleans; this might not, 
however, be a sufficient remedy since nearly every school in New 
Orleans is a charter school.  It might be advantageous, particularly in 
encouraging accountability, if all charter schools were directly 
accountable to popularly elected school boards; local electors would 
then have the power to most directly address the issues associated 
with these boards.  The fact that public accountability might decrease 
the charter schools’ ability to satisfy the demands of accountability 
structures is easily rebuttable with the fact that a lack of electoral 
accountability in Louisiana has resulted in relatively few charter 
schools—low or high performing—closing down as opposed to the 
fact that greater electoral accountability in Florida has resulted in 
relatively more charter schools being closed—despite the fact that 
charter schools in Florida are higher performing than those in 
Louisiana. 
Finally, Congress must agree upon legislation to reinvigorate 
section 4 of the Act.  This will reestablish section 5 as a viable, 
enforceable protection of minority voting interests and perhaps 
enhance the ability of Black voters to pursue educational equality 
through influencing education policy and the politics of education.  
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Many voting rights scholars and voting rights attorneys are 
discussing the need for section 5 to combat unannounced shifts in 
polling places, voter identification requirements, the reduction of 
early voting places and times, and other scandalous attempts to 
prevent minority voters from casting ballots.  All of these issues 
deserve the attention that advocates give to them.  It is also important 
to document and discuss that some states, such as Louisiana, are 
converting previously elected boards into appointed or self-selected 
positions; the newly appointed or self-selected positions, which are 
typically predominately White are replacing predominately Black 
positions.   
Congress specifically envisioned that section 5 would prevent 
states from limiting minority involvement in political activity via rule 
changes as minorities ascended to political power.221  Some 
conservative politicians and political commentators suggest that the 
Act, and particularly section 5, have accomplished this goal.  
Louisiana’s changing rules—exchanging Black policymakers for 
White policymakers—indicates that we still have work to do in 
protecting minorities’ right to political involvement.  Congress has 
work to do.  Some states, including Louisiana, can move to 
immediately protect minority voting rights— in terms of school board 
representation—by requiring that all new and alternative school 
boards answer directly to the politically elected boards before them. 
 
  
 
221.  S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 6 (1982). 
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Table 1.  Summary of Charter School Board President Responses    
                 to Requests for Information on Efforts to Recruit Black  
                 Board Members 
 
Charter School Board  Effort at Recruiting Black Board 
Members 
International School of 
Louisiana 
Recruitment efforts are in 
conjunction with other forms of 
diversity recruitment, which might 
create conflict.  In a numbered list, 
diversity is the last priority listed. 
Lagniappe Academy of 
New Orleans 
No specific recruitment efforts 
mentioned.  Board nominations are 
solicited from parents, board 
members and community partners. 
The Future Is Now 
Schools: New Orleans 
No specific recruitment efforts 
mentioned, but the board seeks to 
include alumni (who, in recent times, 
are disproportionately Black).  
Members are selected on the 
recommendation of board members, 
community and political leaders. 
Morris Jeff Community 
School 
No specific recruitment efforts 
mentioned.  Referrals to the board 
are made specifically by trustees and 
generally by “stakeholders.” 
Algiers Charter Schools 
Association 
The board uses a parental proxy to 
assure parent participation.  The 
board is aggressive in recruiting 
potential board members, using 
various methods of publically 
available advertisements as well as 
recommendations from key 
stakeholders.  Also, long-term 
residency in the predominately Black 
Algiers area of New Orleans is a 
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basic requirement for consideration 
for board membership. 
FirstLine Schools, Inc. 
Charter Schools 
No specific recruitment efforts 
mentioned.  A nominating committee 
refers potential board members to 
the general board after nominations 
and interviews. 
New Orleans College Prep The board president did not answer 
questions regarding board selection 
process. 
Educators for Quality 
Alternatives 
The board president did not answer 
questions regarding board selection 
process. 
ReNew Charter Schools The board president did not answer 
questions regarding board selection 
process. 
 
 
Table 2.  Fisher Exact Test of Independence for Ratio of Charters  
                 Closed and Remaining Open in Louisiana and Florida222 
 
Charter School 
Status Louisiana Florida223 
Marginal 
Rows 
Closed  21 269 290 
Open 91 631 722 
Marginal 
Columns 112 900 1012 (Total) 
 
 
 
222.  P-value = 0.0145 (There is evidence that supports the claim that the ratio of 
school closures (rows) is associated with individual states (columns)). 
223.  Carpenter, supra note 207. 
